Among the documents recently published by "Wikileaks" include the following: cablegate.wikileaks.org / cable
The Italian press has quoted some passages, but often omitting other equally or even more relevant. The invitation to the readers is to consult individually, but for the benefit of the lazy or those who do not know English well, we produce below a summary of the highlights, with our occasional comments.
First of all, say what it is. It is a cable classified "SECRET / / NOFORN": "secret" is the intermediate level between "confidential" and "top secret", while "noforn" indicates that the document should not be shared with foreign nationals (of a ban is therefore stricter than the "restricted," allowing certain exceptions).
The sender and the U.S. Embassy in Rome, and the signature is that of Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador from 10 August 2005-6 February 2009. The document is dated 26 January 2009: Spogli and then forward it a few days before finishing his term. Is addressed to the Secretary of State in Washington. The topic is the relationship between Italy and Russia.
After a little convincing introduction to the roots of the "Russophile" Italian, the document comes alive when it is said that the attention devoted to the relationship with Putin from Rome have a greater impact on our foreign policy than do our own parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ENI. Berlusconi it would feed the belief that Putin, of all the European leaders, who estimated that more, and still is recognized in the style male, assertive and authoritarian Russia of the statesman. According gl'informatori Ambassador - that the document cites contacts in government as well as opposition parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian government itself - Berlusconi and his entourage would derive personal gain from the business with Russia. It quotes Mr Valentino Valentini as "key man" of Berlusconi for relations with Russia.
Italian policy towards Russia is determined by Berlusconi himself, who does not seek or accept advice about it. Minister Frattini, met in September 2008, Dick Cheney, then vice-president of the USA, admitted that it did have a say on relations with Russia. Frattini understand that Cheney would have confided in, assuming you do not share the views of Berlusconi on the Georgian crisis, then under way. Deserves a reflection of the fact that the Minister of Italian Foreign criticized the position of its head of government in a confidential interview with a senior foreign official.
But Berlusconi is not the only one in Italy to row to a strong friendship with Russia. ENI has an "immense political power," and according to informed political Spogli would be the main funder of Italian foreign policy think tanks and would keep on its payroll several journalists. ENI is described as the diplomatic service "unofficial" but real Italy to Russia. And of course the Italian ENI is also the party that speaks more plainly to Americans. Spogli recounts that, at of a meeting in March 2008, ENI's representatives have openly said that in their view, the threat to European energy security is not Russia but Ukraine, and to deal with it and build more pipelines oledotti directly linking Russia to Western Europe. The opposite, in fact, the strategy advocated by the United States. In addition to the well-known commitment of ENI in the Nord Stream and South Stream (the two gas pipelines under construction which crosses the Central and Eastern Europe), society, and together with the help of all'Edison Scajola would precede the construction of 'a modest pipeline Turkey-Greece-Italy the most grandiose project Nabucco, sponsored by the U.S., and in order not to offend Russian susceptibilities.
Because of Berlusconi and ENI, Russia - Spogli complains - in Europe can count on a country that systematically support its cause. All the more so now, being a failed personal relationships that bound the former U.S. president Berlusconi, Bush jr., The head of the Italian government seems destined to draw ever closer to Moscow.
But the U.S. is not willing to look at some pinless. The most interesting part of the document is just one where you describe the countermeasures that Spogli is implementing – ma stranamente è anche la porzione di testo meno citata dalla stampa italiana. L’Ambasciata afferma d’essersi impegnata in colloqui con esponenti politici interni ed esterni al Governo, col fine esplicito di creare, soprattutto all’interno del suo partito, una corrente ostile alla russofilia di Berlusconi. Inoltre, non meglio precisati “pensatoi” sono stati ingaggiati per costruire una corrente d’opinione pubblica ostile alla Russia e, si compiace Spogli, «lo sforzo sembra che stia pagando». L’opposizione si è subito regolata, impegnandosi nella critica del rapporto di Berlusconi con Putin, e taluni membri del PDL si sono rivolti privatamente ad un’ambasciata straniera – ovviamente quella degli USA – «per contrastare l’infatuazione di Berlusconi per la Russia».
Invitiamo i lettori a ponderare bene queste ultime affermazioni di Spogli, ed a confrontarle con quanto accaduto nella stampa, nella società civile e soprattutto nella politica interna italiana dal gennaio 2009 ad oggi.
fonte: Rivista Eurasia
The Italian press has quoted some passages, but often omitting other equally or even more relevant. The invitation to the readers is to consult individually, but for the benefit of the lazy or those who do not know English well, we produce below a summary of the highlights, with our occasional comments.
First of all, say what it is. It is a cable classified "SECRET / / NOFORN": "secret" is the intermediate level between "confidential" and "top secret", while "noforn" indicates that the document should not be shared with foreign nationals (of a ban is therefore stricter than the "restricted," allowing certain exceptions).
The sender and the U.S. Embassy in Rome, and the signature is that of Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador from 10 August 2005-6 February 2009. The document is dated 26 January 2009: Spogli and then forward it a few days before finishing his term. Is addressed to the Secretary of State in Washington. The topic is the relationship between Italy and Russia.
After a little convincing introduction to the roots of the "Russophile" Italian, the document comes alive when it is said that the attention devoted to the relationship with Putin from Rome have a greater impact on our foreign policy than do our own parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ENI. Berlusconi it would feed the belief that Putin, of all the European leaders, who estimated that more, and still is recognized in the style male, assertive and authoritarian Russia of the statesman. According gl'informatori Ambassador - that the document cites contacts in government as well as opposition parties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian government itself - Berlusconi and his entourage would derive personal gain from the business with Russia. It quotes Mr Valentino Valentini as "key man" of Berlusconi for relations with Russia.
Italian policy towards Russia is determined by Berlusconi himself, who does not seek or accept advice about it. Minister Frattini, met in September 2008, Dick Cheney, then vice-president of the USA, admitted that it did have a say on relations with Russia. Frattini understand that Cheney would have confided in, assuming you do not share the views of Berlusconi on the Georgian crisis, then under way. Deserves a reflection of the fact that the Minister of Italian Foreign criticized the position of its head of government in a confidential interview with a senior foreign official.
But Berlusconi is not the only one in Italy to row to a strong friendship with Russia. ENI has an "immense political power," and according to informed political Spogli would be the main funder of Italian foreign policy think tanks and would keep on its payroll several journalists. ENI is described as the diplomatic service "unofficial" but real Italy to Russia. And of course the Italian ENI is also the party that speaks more plainly to Americans. Spogli recounts that, at of a meeting in March 2008, ENI's representatives have openly said that in their view, the threat to European energy security is not Russia but Ukraine, and to deal with it and build more pipelines oledotti directly linking Russia to Western Europe. The opposite, in fact, the strategy advocated by the United States. In addition to the well-known commitment of ENI in the Nord Stream and South Stream (the two gas pipelines under construction which crosses the Central and Eastern Europe), society, and together with the help of all'Edison Scajola would precede the construction of 'a modest pipeline Turkey-Greece-Italy the most grandiose project Nabucco, sponsored by the U.S., and in order not to offend Russian susceptibilities.
Because of Berlusconi and ENI, Russia - Spogli complains - in Europe can count on a country that systematically support its cause. All the more so now, being a failed personal relationships that bound the former U.S. president Berlusconi, Bush jr., The head of the Italian government seems destined to draw ever closer to Moscow.
But the U.S. is not willing to look at some pinless. The most interesting part of the document is just one where you describe the countermeasures that Spogli is implementing – ma stranamente è anche la porzione di testo meno citata dalla stampa italiana. L’Ambasciata afferma d’essersi impegnata in colloqui con esponenti politici interni ed esterni al Governo, col fine esplicito di creare, soprattutto all’interno del suo partito, una corrente ostile alla russofilia di Berlusconi. Inoltre, non meglio precisati “pensatoi” sono stati ingaggiati per costruire una corrente d’opinione pubblica ostile alla Russia e, si compiace Spogli, «lo sforzo sembra che stia pagando». L’opposizione si è subito regolata, impegnandosi nella critica del rapporto di Berlusconi con Putin, e taluni membri del PDL si sono rivolti privatamente ad un’ambasciata straniera – ovviamente quella degli USA – «per contrastare l’infatuazione di Berlusconi per la Russia».
Invitiamo i lettori a ponderare bene queste ultime affermazioni di Spogli, ed a confrontarle con quanto accaduto nella stampa, nella società civile e soprattutto nella politica interna italiana dal gennaio 2009 ad oggi.
fonte: Rivista Eurasia
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